On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games
On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games
复制标题
论古诺寡头博弈及其他博弈中均衡的唯一性
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0037
复制
发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
A. Watts
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Watts
摘要在古诺寡头垄断等平均剩余共享博弈中，一群代理人共享一个生产过程。每个人都为这个过程提供一定数量的投入，产出按投入的比例分配。任何类型的比较静力分析都需要平衡的唯一性。然而，凹形游戏的一般唯一性结果具有对偏好和技术的限制性假设；特别是，随着玩家数量的增加，独特性所需要的条件变得越来越难以满足。给出了一个新的唯一性定理，该定理具有易于解释的条件，与参与人的数量无关。经济文献分类号：C70， C72, D43。
Abstract In an average surplus sharing game, such as a Cournot oligopoly, a group of agents share a production process. Each contributes an amount of input to the process, and output is divided in proportion to the amount of input contributed. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is needed for any type of comparative static analysis. However, general uniqueness results for concave games have restrictive assumptions on preferences and technology; specifically, the conditions needed for uniqueness become more difficult to meet as the number of players increases. A new theorem for uniqueness with easily interpretable conditions is given which is independent of the number of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D43.