Indirect answers as potential solutions to decision problems
Indirect answers as potential solutions to decision problems
复制标题
间接答案作为决策问题的潜在解决方案
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Klabunde
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Stevens;Anton Benz;Sebastian Reuße;Ronja Laarmann;R. Klabunde
我们提出了一个博弈论模型之间的交流的销售代理专家访问数据库的信息和客户谁提出是/否的问题，以帮助解决决策问题的销售代理。我们首先提供了一个博弈论的描述，这样的交流，销售代理人选择一个答案，客户的问题，推理空间的合理的基本决策问题。我们提出了一个模型的答案生成和解释，具体说明了这个游戏的解决方案。该模型适当地选择了一个特定的类是/否问题的间接答案和含义。只要没有说谎的动机，即使说话者和听话者的偏好部分不一致，也可以得出含义。
We present a game-theoretic model of an exchange between a sales agent—an expert with access to a database of information—and a customer who poses yes/no questions to the sales agent in order to help resolve a decision problem. We first provide a game-theoretic description of such an exchange, whereby the sales agent selects an answer to the customer’s question by reasoning about a space of plausible underlying decision problems. We pro-pose a model of both answer generation and interpretation which specifies a solution to this game. The model appropriately selects indirect answers and implicatures for a particular class of yes/no questions. Implicatures can be drawn even when the speaker and hearer have partially misaligned preferences, as long as there is no incentive to lie.