The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?
The Government as Reinsurer of Catastrophe Risks?
复制标题
政府作为巨灾风险的再保险人？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Karine Fiore
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Véronique Bruggeman;M. Faure;Karine Fiore
灾难受害者的赔偿是当今许多国家的热门话题。因此，立法者越来越多地干预巨灾保险市场，以刺激其运作。尽管法律和经济学界对这种类型的政府干预有不同的看法，但各种形式的公私伙伴关系已经发展起来。本文的目的是补充这一争论，一方面，讨论政府作为最后手段再保险公司或主要保险公司的一些具体案例，另一方面，通过使这些实际例子面对政府干预有效或至少尽可能减少破坏性必须满足的五个主要条件：市场失灵、基于风险的保费收费、现有市场解决方案的刺激、选择国家再保险的自由和临时性。
Compensation for victims of catastrophes is a hot topic in many countries today. Consequently, the legislator is increasingly intervening in the catastrophe insurance market in order to stimulate its functioning. Various forms of public-private partnerships have hence developed, although law and economics scholarship has differing views on this type of government intervention. The aim of this paper is to add to that debate by, on the one hand, discussing a few specific cases where the government acts as a reinsurer of last resort or as a primary insurer, and by, on the other hand, confronting these practical examples with five main conditions that would have to be fulfilled to make government intervention efficient—or at least as little disruptive as possible: market failure, the charging of risk-based premiums, the stimulation of existing market solutions, the freedom to choose for State reinsurance and the temporary character.