Trade and Environmental Policy: A Race to the Bottom?
Trade and Environmental Policy: A Race to the Bottom?
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贸易和环境政策：逐底竞争？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
I. Sheldon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. Sheldon
本文的重点是监管降温和环境标准和政策的逐底竞赛问题。特别是，它探讨了解决这一问题的可能性可能在于更灵活地适用现有的《关税与贸易总协定/世界贸易组织》(关贸总协定/世贸组织)规则。讨论的结构分为四个部分：(1)对贸易和环境政策的标准分析；(2)对污染避难所存在的理论分析和经验证据进行了审查；(3)概述了政府可能通过更大程度的贸易自由化削弱国内环境政策的主要论点；(4)对最近对环境税的边境税调整进行的一些分析，得出了本文件的基本结论：现有的GATT/WTO规则已经包含了一种应对任何监管寒意和竞相压低环境政策的倾向的方法。
The focus of this paper is the issue of regulatory chill and a race to the bottom in environmental standards and policies. In particular, it explores the possibility that resolution of this problem may lie in a more flexible application of the existing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) rules. The structure of the discussion is divided into four parts: (i) the standard analysis of trade and environmental policy is laid out; (ii) the theoretical analysis of and empirical evidence for the existence of pollution havens is reviewed; (iii) the main arguments as to why governments may weaken domestic environmental policy with greater trade liberalisation is outlined; and (iv) some recent analysis of border tax adjustments for environmental taxes is laid out, leading to the basic conclusion of the paper: a method for countering any tendency for regulatory chill and a race to the bottom in environmental policies is already embedded in existing GATT/WTO rules.