Labor union members play an OLG repeated game
Labor union members play an OLG repeated game
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1400827111
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发表时间：
2014-07-22
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Obayashi, Shinya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kandori, Michihiro;Obayashi, Shinya
人类有能力与他人合作，即使这是昂贵的，一个偏差提供了立即的收益。一个重要的原因是，合作在后期会得到回报或奖励，而偏离则会受到惩罚。为了使合作可持续发展，不仅要有足够强的奖惩，而且个人也应该有适当的动机来提供奖惩。具有这些属性的行为准则在博弈论中被广泛研究（作为重复博弈均衡），关于合作进化的文献显示了平衡行为如何在社会中出现和扩散。我们发现，社区工会是承认个人隶属关系的工会的一个子类，它是用现实来证实这些理论的理想选择，因为(i)它们的活动很简单，（ii）它们的结构非常类似于理论模型，即重叠的世代重复博弈。一个社区联盟的详细案例研究揭示了在联盟中非常有限的可观察性下可能发挥作用的平衡。基于简单的启发式推理，均衡行为准则似乎是一个自然的焦点。我们所研究的联盟是出于合作的需要而建立的，我们并不知道或预料到合作将如何持续下去。工会已经成功解决了约3000起劳资纠纷，并创造了许多后代。
Humans are capable of cooperating with one another even when it is costly and a deviation provides an immediate gain. An important reason is that cooperation is reciprocated or rewarded and deviations are penalized in later stages. For cooperation to be sustainable, not only must rewards and penalties be strong enough but individuals should also have the right incentives to provide rewards and punishments. Codes of conduct with such properties have been studied extensively in game theory (as repeated game equilibria), and the literature on the evolution of cooperation shows how equilibrium behavior might emerge and proliferate in society. We found that community unions, a subclass of labor unions that admits individual affiliations, are ideal to corroborate these theories with reality, because (i) their activities are simple and (ii) they have a structure that closely resembles a theoretical model, the overlapping generations repeated game. A detailed case study of a community union revealed a possible equilibrium that can function under the very limited observability in the union. The equilibrium code of conduct appears to be a natural focal point based on simple heuristic reasoning. The union we studied was created out of necessity for cooperation, without knowing or anticipating how cooperation might be sustained. The union has successfully resolved about 3,000 labor disputes and created a number of offspring.