Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
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延迟接受算法下的子博弈完美均衡
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-021-00758-0
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Bando Keisuke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kawase Yasushi;Bando Keisuke
我们分析了一个子博弈完美均衡（SPE）的广泛的博弈与完美信息诱导的公司为导向的延迟接受（DA）算法在一对一的匹配市场之间的企业和工人。我们的博弈重复下面的过程，直到市场上的每个企业都有一个合作伙伴：（i）一个不匹配的企业战略性地决定向哪个工人提出要约或退出市场，（ii）接受要约的工人战略性地决定暂时接受还是拒绝它。我们表明，工人最佳的稳定匹配是唯一的SPE结果时，只有工人的战略。相比之下，可能存在多个SPE结果，可能包括只有公司具有战略性时的不稳定匹配。我们发现，每个公司弱更喜欢任何SPE的结果，以工人最佳的稳定匹配和匹配引起的Kesten的效率调整DA算法可以实现作为一个SPE。当工人和企业的战略，我们还表明，工人最优的稳定匹配仍然是唯一的SPE的结果。
We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect information induced by the firm-oriented deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm in a one-to-one matching market between firms and workers. Our game repeats the following procedure until every firm in the market has a partner: (i) an unmatched firm strategically decides to which worker to make an offer or to exit the market, and (ii) the worker receiving the offer strategically decides whether to tentatively accept or reject it. When no agents are strategic, the resulting outcome is the firm-optimal stable matching. We show that the worker-optimal stable matching is the unique SPE outcome when only workers are strategic. By contrast, multiple SPE outcomes may exist, possibly including unstable matchings when only firms are strategic. We show that every firm weakly prefers any SPE outcome to the worker-optimal stable matching and that the matching induced by Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted DA algorithm can be achieved as an SPE. When both workers and firms are strategic, we also show that the worker-optimal stable matching is still the unique SPE outcome.