An Analysis of Pricing Competition for Queued Services with Multiple Providers
An Analysis of Pricing Competition for Queued Services with Multiple Providers
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发表时间：
2008
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通讯作者：
Parijat Dube;R. Jain;Corinne Touati
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作者：
Parijat Dube;R. Jain;Corinne Touati
我们对竞争网络服务市场中服务提供商的容量、服务质量（QoS）和提供价格之间的关系进行建模。容量和服务质量通过简单的排队公式相关联，而服务质量和价格通过客户偏好分布相耦合。我们研究了提供商的市场份额对价格、容量和市场规模的敏感性。我们重新审视了已被证明会导致所有提供商利润为零的“价格战”概念，并得出结论：我们更通用的模型确实存在某种异常行为，但不一定会导致利润为零。我们的研究揭示了均衡解的重要性质，这些性质可被利用来为网络资源市场中竞争的企业提供性能规划和定价策略的有用指导方针。
We model the relationship between capacity, Quality of Service (QoS) and offered prices of service providers in a competitive network services market. Capacity and QoS are linked through simple queueing formulae while QoS and price are coupled through distributions on customer preferences. We study the sensitivity of market share of providers to price, capacity and market size. We revisit the notion of “price wars” that has been shown to lead to zero profits for all providers and conclude that our more general model does admit some form of anomalous behavior, but which need not lead to zero profits. Our study reveals important properties of the equilibrium solution which may be exploited to provide useful guidelines for performance planning and pricing strategies for firms competing in network resource markets.