Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills
Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills
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股东提案都是光说不练吗？
DOI：
10.2307/2331129
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Christopher J. Marquette
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
John M. Bizjak;Christopher J. Marquette
摘要我们提供了股东决议的全面审查，以撤销毒丸。我们发现，避孕药撤销提议的频率越高，市场对最初的避孕药采用的负面反应越大，内部人和独立股东的持股比例就越低。当业绩不佳时，支持这样一项提案的票数会增加，而支持更繁重的毒丸的票数也会增加。虽然我们记录了与计划宣布相关的股价下跌，但我们发现，当有股东决议时，毒丸更有可能被重组或撤销。此外，药片的修订与股东财富的增加有关。总体而言，我们的结果表明，当避孕药更有可能损害股东利益，且经理对股东提议做出回应时，避孕药撤销提议的频率更高。
Abstract We provide a comprehensive examination of shareholder resolutions to rescind poison pills. We find that pill rescission proposals are more frequent the more negative the market reaction to the initial pill adoption and the lower the insider and unaffiliated block ownership. Votes for such a proposal increase when performance is poor and for more onerous poison pills. While we document a stock price decline associated with the proposal announcements, we find poison pills are more likely to be restructured or rescinded when there is a shareholder resolution. Moreover, pill revisions are associated with stockholder wealth increases. Collectively, our results suggest that pill rescission proposals are more frequent when the pill is more likely to harm shareholders and that managers respond to shareholder proposals.