Monetary policy and labor market frictions: A tax interpretation
Monetary policy and labor market frictions: A tax interpretation
复制标题
货币政策和劳动力市场摩擦：税收解释
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.01.003
复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
C. Walsh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Federico Ravenna;C. Walsh
在具有名义刚性和劳动力市场摩擦的模型中复制灵活的价格分配，导致失业工人与职位空缺的低效匹配，即使可行，通常也是不可取的。我们描述了实施第一最佳配置的税收工具的特征，并研究了如果这些税收工具不可用，货币政策所面临的权衡。我们的税收解释有助于解释为什么低效劳动力市场搜索的福利成本可能很大，而偏离价格稳定的动机却很小。在劳动力流动更不稳定的经济体，从价格稳定中获得的收益更大。
Replicating the flexible price allocation in models with nominal rigidities and labor market frictions that lead to an inefficient matching of unemployed workers with job vacancies, even if feasible, is generally not desirable. We characterize the tax instruments that implement the first best allocation and examine the trade-offs faced by monetary policy if these tax instruments are unavailable. Our tax interpretation helps explain why the welfare cost of inefficient labor market search can be large while the incentive to deviate from price stability is small. Gains from deviating from price stability are larger in economies with more volatile labor flows.