Experiments on Aristotle’s Thesis: Towards an Experimental Philosophy of Conditionals
Experiments on Aristotle’s Thesis: Towards an Experimental Philosophy of Conditionals
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亚里士多德论文的实验：走向条件句的实验哲学
DOI：
10.5840/monist201295213
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
PD Dr. Dr. Niki Pfeifer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
PD Dr. Dr. Niki Pfeifer
两个实验（N1 = 141，N2 = 40）首次研究了亚里士多德命题的两个版本。亚里士多德的命题是一个否定条件句，它由一个命题变量和一个否定项组成，否定项在前件（版本1）或后件（版本2）中。这个任务允许推断人们是否将指示性条件句解释为实质条件句或条件事件。在第一个实验中，我调查了参与者之间的两个版本的亚里士多德的论文与抽象和具体的任务材料交叉。所有四组的模态反应与条件事件一致，与材料条件解释不一致。这一观察结果在第二个实验中得到了重复。此外，第二个实验排除了条件句否定的范围歧义。这两个实验都提供了新的证据，反对条件句的物质条件解释，并支持条件事件解释。最后，我讨论了指示性条件句的建模和实验哲学这项工作的相关性的影响。
Two experiments (N1 = 141, N2 = 40) investigate two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis for the first time. Aristotle’s Thesis is a negated conditional, which consists of one propositional variable with a negation either in the antecedent (version 1) or in the consequent (version 2). This task allows to infer if people interpret indicative conditionals as material conditionals or as conditional events. In the first experiment I investigate between-participants the two versions of Aristotle’s Thesis crossed with abstract versus concrete task material. The modal response for all four groups is consistent with the conditional event and inconsistent with the material conditional interpretation. This observation is replicated in the second experiment. Moreover, the second experiment rules out scope ambiguities of the negation of conditionals. Both experiments provide new evidence against the material conditional interpretation of conditionals and support the conditional event interpretation. Finally, I discuss implications for modeling indicative conditionals and the relevance of this work for experimental philosophy.