Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems : A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency
Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems : A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency
复制标题
排队问题中的策略证明和匿名规则:公平与效率之间的关系
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-011-0540-7
复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
齋藤弘樹
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
橋本和彦;齋藤弘樹
考虑排队问题中公平与效率的关系。我们证明了在策略证明下，福利中的匿名性意味着队列效率。此外，通过结合kayye和Ramaekers（游戏经济学行为68:220-232,2010）的结果与我们的结果，我们还给出了满足策略验证性、福利匿名性和预算平衡的规则类别的特征。
We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.