The Uneasy Case for Product Liability
The Uneasy Case for Product Liability
复制标题
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2009-11
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
A. Polinsky;S. Shavell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Polinsky;S. Shavell
在这篇文章中，我们比较了产品责任的好处和它的成本，并得出结论，产品责任的情况是弱的产品范围很广。产品责任的一个好处是，它可以促使企业提高产品安全。然而，即使在没有产品责任的情况下，公司也经常受到市场力量的激励，加强产品安全，因为如果他们的产品伤害消费者，他们的销售可能会下降。此外，产品必须经常符合安全规定。因此，产品责任可能不会对产品安全产生显著的额外影响——对几种广泛销售的产品的实证研究未能发现产品责任对产品事故频率的影响。产品责任的第二个好处是，它可以通过提高产品价格来反映产品风险，从而改善消费者的购买决策。但由于诉讼成本和其他因素，产品责任可能会过度提高价格，并不利地抑制购买。产品责任的第三个好处是，它补偿了与产品有关的事故受害者的损失。然而，这种好处只是部分的，因为事故受害者经常得到保险公司的部分或全部赔偿。此外，对痛苦和苦难的赔偿实际上减少了个人的福利，因为它实际上迫使他们为一种他们通常不希望得到赔偿的损失购买保险。抵消产品责任的潜在好处的是它的成本，这是巨大的。值得注意的是，通过责任制度向产品事故的受害者转移一美元，平均需要超过一美元的法律费用。鉴于有限的利益和产品责任的高成本，我们得出的判断是，它的使用往往是没有根据的。市场力量和监管相对强大的产品尤其可能出现这种情况，其中包括许多广泛销售的产品。另一方面，对于这些因素较弱的产品，使用产品责任可能是可取的。我们对市场力量和监管强大的产品的产品责任的普遍怀疑评估与这种责任的广泛社会认可是紧张的。
In this Article we compare the benefits of product liability to its costs and conclude that the case for product liability is weak for a wide range of products. One benefit of product liability is that it can induce firms to improve product safety. Even in the absence of product liability, however, firms are often motivated by market forces to enhance product safety because their sales may fall if their products harm consumers. Moreover, products must frequently conform to safety regulations. Consequently, product liability might not be expected to exert a significant additional influence on product safety — and empirical studies of several widely sold products fail to find an effect of product liability on the frequency of product accidents. A second benefit of product liability is that it can improve consumer purchase decisions by causing product prices to increase to reflect product risks. But because of litigation costs and other factors, product liability may raise prices excessively and undesirably chill purchases. A third benefit of product liability is that it compensates victims of product-related accidents for their losses. Yet this benefit is only partial, for accident victims are frequently compensated by insurers for some or all of their losses. Furthermore, the payment of compensation for pain and suffering actually reduces the welfare of individuals because it effectively forces them to purchase insurance for a type of loss for which they ordinarily do not wish to be covered. Offsetting the potential benefits of product liability are its costs, which are great. Notably, the transfer of a dollar to a victim of a product accident via the liability system requires more than a dollar on average in legal expenses. Given the limited benefits and the high costs of product liability, we come to the judgment that its use is often unwarranted. This is especially likely for products for which market forces and regulation are relatively strong, which includes many widely sold products. On the other hand, the use of product liability may be desirable for products for which these factors are weak. Our generally skeptical assessment of product liability for products for which market forces and regulation are strong is in tension with the broad social endorsement of such liability.