Information verifiability, bank organization, bank competition and bankborrower relationships
Information verifiability, bank organization, bank competition and bankborrower relationships
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.09.010
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发表时间：
2011-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Masaji Kano;H. Uchida;Gregory F. Udell;W. Watanabe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masaji Kano;H. Uchida;Gregory F. Udell;W. Watanabe
本文研究了银行与借款人关系的收益是否因理论文献中确定的三个因素而有所不同：信息的可验证性、银行规模和复杂性以及银行竞争。我们通过在同时考虑所有这三个因素的实证模型中分析关系贷款如何影响贷款合同条款和信贷可用性来扩展现有文献。根据日本的调查数据，我们发现有证据表明，在信贷可用性方面，银行与借款人关系的加强所带来的好处仅限于规模较小的银行。然而，当用改善的信贷条件来衡量收益时，我们发现，对于不透明的借款人和从小银行获得资金的借款人来说，加强关系几乎没有带来额外的好处，在某些情况下甚至增加了成本。后面的这些发现表明，关系借款人可能会遭受捕获效应的影响。
This paper investigates whether the benefits of bank–borrower relationships differ depending on three factors identified in the theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and bank competition. We extend the current literature by analyzing how relationship lending affects loan contract terms and credit availability in an empirical model that simultaneously accounts for all three of these factors. Based on Japanese survey data we find evidence that the benefits from stronger bank–borrower relationships in terms of credit availability are limited to smaller banks. However, when the benefits are measured as improved credit terms, we find little additional benefit, and in some cases increased cost, from stronger relationships for opaque borrowers and for borrowers who get funding from small banks. These latter findings suggest the possibility that relationship borrowers may suffer from capture effects.