Takeover protection and stock price crash risk: Evidence from state antitakeover laws
Takeover protection and stock price crash risk: Evidence from state antitakeover laws
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.08.021
复制
发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
11.3
通讯作者：
R. Bhargava;Sheri Faircloth;Hongchao Zeng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Bhargava;Sheri Faircloth;Hongchao Zeng
我们利用国家反收购法的通过来考察收购保护与股价暴跌风险之间的关系。我们发现，在通过法律的州注册的公司与未来的股价崩盘风险负相关，这表明收购保护减轻了坏消息囤积活动。进一步的分析表明，当企业存在严重的信息不对称或面临激烈的产品市场竞争时，缓解效应更加明显。总而言之，我们的发现揭示了收购威胁对管理层囤积坏消息的激励的影响。
We exploit the passage of state antitakeover laws to examine the relation between takeover protection and stock price crash risk. We find that firms incorporated in states that passed the laws are negatively associated with future stock price crash risk in the post-law periods, suggesting that takeover protection mitigates bad news hoarding activities. Further analysis shows that the mitigating effect is more pronounced when firms have severe information asymmetry or face strong product market competition. Together, our findings shed new light on the impact of takeover threats on managerial incentives to engage in bad news hoarding.