Dynamic Speculative Attacks
Dynamic Speculative Attacks
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动态投机攻击
DOI：
10.1257/000282803322157007
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Christophe Chamley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Christophe Chamley
本文提出了一个在固定汇率制度下进行投机攻击的理性贝叶斯代理模型。投机者通过观察区间内的汇率来了解他们的质量是否足够大以进行成功的攻击。投机攻击的存在需要多个时期。分析了各种国防政策。如果央行的交易政策不被遵守，那么它可能会捍卫钉住汇率制，并减少市场对投机者协调的信息。
This paper presents a model of rational Bayesian agents with speculative attacks in a regime of exchange rate which is pegged within a band. Speculators learn from the observation of the exchange rate within the band whether their mass is sufficiently large for a successful attack. Multiple periods are necessary for the existence of speculative attacks. Various defense policies are analyzed. A trading policy by the central bank may defend the peg if it is unobserved and diminishes the market's information for the coordination of speculators.