We all lost the Cold War
We all lost the Cold War
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我们都输掉了冷战
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Stein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Lebow;J. Stein
这本书的目的是利用两次实际冷战危机的经验来检验这样一个假设：美国的威慑战略主要负责阻止与苏联的战争，并告诉他们侵略是不会有回报的。两次危机； 1962年的古巴导弹危机和1973年的中东危机被广泛解读为美国威慑战略的胜利。作者利用了以前无法获得的资料，包括文件和采访。作者表明，正是对任何核武器使用的恐惧，而不是对核平衡的定量评估，在所研究的两次危机中阻止了苏联和美国领导人。双方都认为，即使失去一座城市也是不可接受的。这意味着核武器的好处来自于它们摧毁城市的能力。有限威慑政策几乎完全依赖于对平民的这种威胁，从而引发进一步的道德问题。
The purpose of the book is to use the experience of two actual Cold War crises to test the hypothesis that it was the U.S. strategy of deterrence that was primarily responsible for preventing war with the Soviet Union and teaching them that aggression would not pay. The two crises; the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Middle East crisis of 1973 have been widely interpreted as victories for U.S. deterence strategy. The authors draw on sources that were previously unavailable, both documents and interviews. The authors show that it was the fear of any nuclear use, not quantitative assessments of the nuclear balance, that deterred both Soviet and American leaders in the two crises examined. Each side believed that the loss of even a single city was unacceptable. This implies that the benefits of nuclear weapons derive from their ability to annihilate cities. A policy of finite deterence would rely almost exclusively on this threat to civilians, raising further moral questions.