Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization
Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization
复制标题
DOI：
10.1023/a:1016511918510
复制
发表时间：
2002-08
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Marko Köthenbürger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Marko Köthenbürger
本文分析了税收竞争与财政均等化的关系。特别是，它提出了一个问题，即财政均衡化计划是否能够缓解无效的税收竞争。考虑了两种转移方案：税收转移方案和税基均衡转移方案。文章表明，均等化转移可能会使财政外部性内部化。特别是，在一个小型开放经济体中，税基均衡化会产生有效的税率。因此，具有明显再分配特征的转移机制并不总是损害效率。
This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.