Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data
Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data
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DOI：
10.1093/qje/120.3.917
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发表时间：
2005-08-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Rasul, I
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bandiera, O;Barankay, I;Rasul, I
我们通过比较员工在相对激励下的生产率(个人努力对他人造成负外部性)和在计件工资下的生产率(没有)，提出了工人是否具有社会偏好的证据。我们发现，在计件工资的情况下，普通工人的生产率至少比在相对激励下高出50%。我们发现，这是由于员工在相对激励下将他们的努力强加给他人的负外部性部分内化，特别是在与朋友一起工作时。在计件工资制度下，工人之间的关系不会影响生产率。进一步的分析表明，只有当员工能够监督他人和被监督时，他们才会内部化外部性。这排除了纯粹的利他主义是工人行为的根本动机。
We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers' productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, with their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under piece rates than under relative incentives. We show that this is due to workers partially internalizing the negative externality their effort imposes on others under relative incentives, especially when working alongside their friends. Under piece rates, the relationship among workers does not affect productivity. Further analysis reveals that workers internalize the externality only when they can monitor others and be monitored. This rules out pure altruism as the underlying motive of workers' behavior.