Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF's Lending Decisions
Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF's Lending Decisions
复制标题
偏袒：共同信念如何影响国际货币基金组织的贷款决策
作者：
S. Nelson
摘要 国际组织（IO）遍布世界政治，但国际货币基金组织（IMF）是一个异常重要的国际组织。我的研究表明，国际货币基金组织的贷款存在系统性偏差。优惠待遇很大程度上取决于国际货币基金组织官员与借款国主要经济政策制定者所持信念的相似程度。本文将国际货币基金组织的理念文化描述为“新自由主义”，并假设其在观察窗口（1980-2000）期间保持稳定。然而，借款国最高经济政策制定者的信念与国际货币基金组织官员的信念之间存在差异。当新自由主义者控制最高经济政策职位时，政策团队的信念与国际货币基金组织之间的距离就会缩小；因此，国际货币基金组织的贷款变得不那么繁重、更加慷慨，而且执行也不太严格。我收集了 1980 年至 2000 年间 486 个项目的条件数量和贷款相对规模的数据。我收集了有关豁免的数据，这些豁免允许未遵守约束条件的国家继续获得资金，作为执行的指标。我依靠从包含 90 个发展中国家 2,000 多名政策制定者的传记细节的新数据集中收集到的间接指标来衡量最高政策官员中新自由主义者的比例。一系列统计测试的证据表明，随着借款政府中新自由主义者比例的增加，国际货币基金组织的交易变得相对更有利。
Abstract International organizations (IOs) suffuse world politics, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stands out as an unusually important IO. My research suggests that IMF lending is systematically biased. Preferential treatment is largely driven by the degree of similarity between beliefs held by IMF officials and key economic policy-makers in the borrowing country. This article describes the IMF's ideational culture as “neoliberal,” and assumes it to be stable during the observation window (1980–2000). The beliefs of top economic policy-makers in borrowing countries, however, vary in terms of their distance from IMF officials' beliefs. When fellow neoliberals control the top economic policy posts the distance between the means of the policy team's beliefs and the IMF narrows; consequently, IMF loans become less onerous, more generous, and less rigorously enforced. I gathered data on the number of conditions and the relative size of loans for 486 programs in the years between 1980 and 2000. I collected data on waivers, which allow countries that have missed binding conditions to continue to access funds, as an indicator for enforcement. I rely on indirect indicators, gleaned from a new data set that contains biographical details of more than 2,000 policy-makers in ninety developing countries, to construct a measure of the proportion of the top policy officials that are fellow neoliberals. The evidence from a battery of statistical tests reveals that as the proportion of neoliberals in the borrowing government increases, IMF deals get comparatively sweeter.
DOI：
10.2307/jj.16552219
发表时间：
2018-04
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
E. Haas
通讯作者：
E. Haas