Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets
Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets
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银行风险监管的市场纪律：来自资本市场的新证据
DOI：
10.2307/1992286
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发表时间：
1988
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. A. Goldberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Avery;Terrence M. Belton;M. A. Goldberg
这项研究通过分析银行相关债务和可比国债之间的利差对银行风险衡量的敏感性，评估了银行次级票据和债券加强市场纪律的潜力。分析表明，次级票据和债券的市场纪律收益似乎相对较小。此外，即使债券评级机构可以诱导银行家以一种特定的方式行事，研究结果也表明，监管机构可能不会认为这种诱导行为与他们的安全和稳健标准一致。俄亥俄州立大学出版社版权所有1988年。
This study evaluates the potential for bank subordinated notes and debentures to enhance market discipline by analyzing the sensitivity of the interest-rate spread between bank-related debt and comparable Treasury securities to measu res of bank risk. The analysis indicates that the market discipline benefits of subordinated notes and debentures appear to be relatively small. Furthermore, even if the bond rating agencies could induce bankers to behave in a particular way, the findings suggest this induced behavior may not be viewed by regulators as consistent with their standards of safety and soundness. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.