Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism
Setting trigger price in emissions permit markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism
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DOI：
10.1007/s11149-011-9168-x
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发表时间：
2012-06
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
A. Maeda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Maeda
本研究发展了一个分析模型的排放市场配备了安全阀机制。它研究了监管机构如何通过设定两个政策参数来控制排放者的减排量：排放目标和触发价格。我证明了这两个政策参数的能力，极大地影响了不受约束的总排放量的不确定性。我还表明，存在一个特定的目标和定价设置的组合，消除了需要考虑不确定性不受约束的总排放量时，监管机构设定减排目标。该模型及其研究结果确定了一个规则，以确定与可交易许可证制度的总体设计有关的触发价格，从而为设计许可证市场提供了实际指导。
This study develops an analytical model of emissions markets equipped with a safety valve mechanism. It examines how a regulator can control emission reductions by emitters by setting two policy parameters: emission targets and trigger prices. I demonstrate that the capabilities of these two policy parameters are greatly affected by uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions. I also show that there exists a specific combination of target and trigger-price settings that eliminates the need to consider uncertainty regarding unconstrained aggregate emissions when regulators set emission reduction goals. The model and its findings identify a rule for setting trigger prices with respect to the total design of tradable permit systems and thus offer practical guidance in designing a permit market.