Governing Emerging Stock Markets: Legal vs Administrative Governance
Governing Emerging Stock Markets: Legal vs Administrative Governance
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00398.x
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发表时间：
2005-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Katharina Pistor;Chenggang Xu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Katharina Pistor;Chenggang Xu
转型经济体面临着一个根本性的困境。他们需要发展金融市场，但他们缺乏做到这一点所需的要素。在其他地方行之有效的法律治理机制，包括法院的被动执法和监管机构的主动执法，在中短期内可能没有帮助。利用中国和俄罗斯股市发展的经验，本文认为，至少在短期内，行政治理可能是新兴股市法律治理的一种可行选择。
Transition economies face a fundamental dilemma. They need to develop financial markets, and yet they lack the ingredients it takes to do so. Recipes for legal governance mechanisms that have worked elsewhere, including reactive law enforcement by courts and proactive law enforcement by regulators, may not help in the short to medium term. Using evidence from stock market development in China and Russia, this paper suggests that at least in the short term, administrative governance may be a viable alternative to legal governance in emerging stock markets.