Hostile Control of Ships via False GPS Signals: Demonstration and Detection
Hostile Control of Ships via False GPS Signals: Demonstration and Detection
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DOI：
10.1002/navi.183
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发表时间：
2017-03-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Humphreys, Todd E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bhatti, Jahshan;Humphreys, Todd E.
分析和演示了攻击者通过广播伪造的民用全球定位系统(GPS)信号来控制海面船只的能力。这项工作的目的是探索民用海上运输对欺骗性GPS信号的脆弱性，并开发一种与现代船舶上常见的传感器兼容的检测技术。研究表明，尽管可以获得各种高质量的导航和监视传感器，但现代海上导航在很大程度上依赖于卫星导航，欺骗性攻击可以伪装成缓慢变化的洋流的影响。开发并分析了一种基于创新的检测框架，该框架优化选择测量采样间隔，以最小化船舶在未被检测的情况下超过警戒极限的概率。一项现场实验证实了这一脆弱性分析，证明了地中海上一艘65米长的游艇受到了敌意控制。版权所有(C)2017航海学院。
An attacker's ability to control a maritime surface vessel by broadcasting counterfeit civil Global Positioning System (GPS) signals is analyzed and demonstrated. The aim of this work is to explore civil maritime transportation's vulnerability to deceptive GPS signals and to develop a detection technique that is compatible with sensors commonly available on modern ships. It is shown that despite access to a variety of high-quality navigation and surveillance sensors, modern maritime navigation depends crucially on satellite navigation and that a deception attack can be disguised as the effects of slowly-changing ocean currents. An innovations-based detection framework that optimally chooses the measurement sampling interval to minimize the probability of a ship exceeding its alert limits without detection is developed and analyzed. A field experiment confirms the vulnerability analysis by demonstrating hostile control of a 65-m yacht in the Mediterranean Sea. Copyright (C) 2017 Institute of Navigation.