On Technology Licensing in a Stackelberg Duopoly
On Technology Licensing in a Stackelberg Duopoly
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论斯塔克尔伯格双寡头垄断中的技术许可
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-8454.2004.00241.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Bill Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
X. Wang;Bill Yang
本文发现，在线性Stackelberg双头垄断模型中，无论是以固定费用还是以单位产出提成的形式，跟随者都更有可能将降低成本的创新授权给领导者。在固定费用许可下，追随者从小创新中获得更多，而领导者从大型非激烈创新中获得更多。在专利授权下，追随者从创新中获得的收益总是比领先者多。
This paper finds that in a linear Stackelberg duopoly model, the follower is more likely to license a cost-reducing innovation to the leader than the leader is to the follower, regardless of whether licensing is in the form of a fixed fee or royalty per unit of output. Under fixed-fee licensing, the follower gains more from small innovations while the leader gains more from large non-drastic innovations. Under royalty licensing, the follower always gains more than the leader from an innovation.