Political Business Cycles and Endogenous Elections
Political Business Cycles and Endogenous Elections
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政治经济周期和内生选举
DOI：
10.2307/1061215
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hakan Berument
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jac C. Heckelman;Hakan Berument
当现任政府有权要求提前选举时，对政治经济周期(PBC)的实证研究可能会受到内生性偏差的影响。使用工具变量(IV)例程对日本和英国的数据进行分析，我们发现强有力的证据支持这样的观点，即选举时机是经济的函数，而不是像PBC假设的那样，宏观经济是由选举驱动的。在单方程回归中，没有发现政治周期的证据，但豪斯曼检验表明，选举在我们的回归中是内生的。通过IV估计揭示了日本的货币周期和英国的通胀周期。
Empirical research of political business cycles (PBCs) may suffer from endogeneity bias when incumbent governments have discretion to call for an early election. Using an instrumental variable (IV) routine on data from Japan and the U.K., we find strong evidence to support the notion that election timing is a function of the economy rather than the macroeconomy being driven by elections as assumed in PBC. In single-equation regressions, no evidence of political cycles are found, but Hausman tests suggest elections are endogenous in our regressions. A monetary cycle in Japan and an inflation cycle in the U.K. are uncovered through IV estimation.