On the presuppositions of number sentences
On the presuppositions of number sentences
复制标题
论数句的预设
作者：
本文关注的是一个直观的对比，当我们考虑含有空的明确描述的句子。像“法国国王是秃头”这样的句子看起来既不正确也不错误，而像“我的朋友被法国国王访问”这样的句子看起来是错误的。最近，斯蒂芬·亚布洛（Stephen Yablo）提出了一个关于这种直观对比的解释。雅布洛的叙述特别有趣，因为它对诸如“行星的数量是偶数”这样的数字句子的本体论承诺有重要的影响。然而，该文件认为，Yablo的帐户是没有说服力的，因此，它不能建立这些后果。此外，它还发展了一种关于直观对比的斯特劳森式的解释。发达国家的帐户使我们能够得出重要的结论，正确的分析明确的描述和存在的句子含有明确的描述。
This paper is concerned with an intuitive contrast that arises when we consider sentences containing empty definite descriptions. A sentence like ‘The king of France is bald’ appears neither true nor false, while a sentence like ‘My friend was visited by the king of France’ appears false. Recently, Stephen Yablo has suggested an account of this intuitive contrast. Yablo’s account is particularly interesting, since it has important consequences for the ontological commitments of number sentences like ‘The number of planets is even’. However, the paper argues that Yablo’s account is not convincing and that it can thus not establish these consequences. Further, it develops a Strawsonian account of the intuitive contrast. The developed account allows us to draw important conclusions regarding the correct analysis of definite descriptions and of existence sentences containing definite descriptions.