Transparency of Banking Supervisors
Transparency of Banking Supervisors
复制标题
银行监管机构的透明度
DOI：
10.1057/imfer.2013.11
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
J. de Haan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Liedorp;Robert H. J. Mosch;Carin van der Cruijsen;J. de Haan
本文在Eijffinger和Geraats(2006)的基础上，构建了一个综合考虑政治透明度、经济透明度、程序透明度、政策透明度和业务透明度的银行监管透明度指数。基于一项调查，该指数是为24名银行监管机构构建的。平均得分为8.4分(满分15分)，最低为5.5分，最高为12分。平均而言，政治透明度在样本中最高，而程序透明度最低。分析表明，很难找出可以解释监管透明度巨大差异的因素，这表明具体国家的发展推动了透明度。
Following Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), this paper constructs an index of transparency of banking supervisors that takes political, economic, procedural, policy, and operational transparency into account. Based on a survey, the index is constructed for 24 banking supervisors. The average score is 8.4 points (out of 15), whereas the minimum is 5.5 and the maximum 12 points. On average, political transparency is the highest in the sample, while procedural transparency is the lowest. The analysis suggests that it is very hard to identify factors that can explain the large differences in supervisory transparency, suggesting that country-specific developments drive transparency.