Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?
Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?
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DOI：
10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00033-8
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发表时间：
2000-01-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Oechssler, J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Huck, S;Normann, HT;Oechssler, J
本文研究了公司特定数据的公布对实验性寡头垄断市场竞争力的影响。我们比较了两种处理方法：一种是，公司被告知竞争对手的行动和利润。在另一种情况下，企业只得到关于其竞争对手行动的总体信息（平均数量或价格）。我们发现更多的信息会导致更多的竞争。在给定总体信息的情况下，我们证实了Bertrand市场比Cournot市场更具竞争性的理论结果。(C)2000爱思唯尔科技有限公司。保留所有权利。JEL分类：L13; C92：C72。
This paper investigates the impact the publication of firm-specific data has on the competitiveness of experimental oligopoly markets. We compare two treatments: in one, firms are informed about their rivals' actions and profits. In the other, firms are only given aggregate information about their rivals' actions (average quantities or prices). We find that more information leads to more competition. In the treatment where aggregate information is given, we confirm the theoretical result that Bertrand markets are more competitive than Cournot markets. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: L13; C92: C72.