Safe at Home: Towards a Feminist Critique of Cybersecurity
Safe at Home: Towards a Feminist Critique of Cybersecurity
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在家安全：对网络安全的女权主义批评
DOI：
10.1176/jnp.7.4.437
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Julia Slupska
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Julia Slupska
国际关系的女权主义理论家长期以来一直认为，公共/私人的二元性强化了性别不安全感的附属地位，因此这些安全问题被“个性化”并从公共和政治领域中剔除。这篇文章认为，新兴的网络安全领域有可能通过忽略或忽视性别技术促进的虐待，如“复仇色情”和亲密伴侣暴力（IPV），重新创造这些动态。本文回顾了40篇智能家居安全分析论文，以表明IPV的威胁模型在这篇文献中几乎完全缺失。最后，我概述了网络安全研究和设计的一些建议，并重申了信息架构的批判性研究的重要性，现代研究IR。
Feminist theorists of international relations (IR) have long argued that binaries of public/private reinforce the subsidiary status given to gendered insecurities, so that these security problems are ‘individualised’ and taken out of the public and political domain. This article argues that the emerging field of cybersecurity risks recreating these dynamics by omitting or dismissing gendered technologically-facilitated abuse such as ‘revenge porn’ and intimate partner violence (IPV). I present a review of forty smart home security analysis papers to show the threat model of IPV is almost entirely absent in this literature. I conclude by outlining some suggestions for cybersecurity research and design, and reaffirming the importance of critical studies of information architecture to the modern study of IR.