The Justification of Associative Duties
The Justification of Associative Duties
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DOI：
10.1163/17455243-4681050
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发表时间：
2016-01-01
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Lazar, Seth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lazar, Seth
人们往往认为，他们与家人、朋友、同志和同胞的特殊关系，可以接地道德的理由。在这些原因中，他们认为有些是义务-当与其他考虑发生冲突时，这些义务具有真正的重要性。在本文中，我问：什么是潜在的道德结构的联想责任？我首先考虑并拒绝正统的目的论福利主义者的解释，它首先指出特殊关系是人类福祉的基础，然后声称如果我们不承认联想义务，我们就不能有这些关系，然后得出结论，我们因此应该承认联想义务。然后，我介绍了一个非目的论的替代方案，在适当的反应方法伦理理论的基础上。
People often think that their special relationships with family, friends, comrades and compatriots, can ground moral reasons. Among these reasons, they understand some to be duties - pro tanto requirements that have genuine weight when they conflict with other considerations. In this paper I ask: what is the underlying moral structure of associative duties? I first consider and reject the orthodox Teleological Welfarist account, which first observes that special relationships are fundamental for human well-being, then claims that we cannot have these relationships, if we do not recognise associative duties, before concluding that we should therefore recognise associative duties. I then introduce a nonteleological alternative, grounded in the Appropriate Response approach to ethical theory.