A Theory of Content and Other Essays.
A Theory of Content and Other Essays.
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内容理论和其他论文。
DOI：
10.2307/2219687
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Fodor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Millar;J. Fodor
这本新发表的和以前发表的论文集反映了当今杰出的心灵哲学家之一的主要研究和思想。前七篇文章是哲学文章，重点关注心理表征和意向性的基础；接下来是四篇关于认知结构的心理学论文。福多在他雄辩的介绍中展示了这两个领域如何在主题上统一和认识论上相关，强调他对寻找心理内容整体描述的替代方案的关注。福多的哲学论文发展了一种语义学的信息观，为意义的原子论提供了可能性。他的心理学论文提出了认知结构的模块化视图，提供了关于感知的原子论的可能性。他指出，这些想法以本书最后一篇文章开始探索的方式与认识论结合在一起。总而言之，这些文章代表了福多的积极尝试，试图打破当前流行的相对主义的基础，以表明语义和心理整体论的论据是不切实际的，并且存在有待探索的重要替代方案。杰里·A·福多 (Jerry A. Fodor) 是罗格斯大学和纽约城市大学研究生中心的哲学教授。布拉德福德的书
This collection of new and previously published essays reflects the major research and thought of one of today's preeminent philosophers of mind. The first seven essays are philosophical pieces that focus on mental representation and the foundations of intentionality; these are followed by four psychological essays on cognitive architecture. In his eloquent introduction Fodor shows how the two areas are thematically united and epistemologically related, highlighting his concern in finding alternatives to holistic accounts of mental content. Fodor's philosophical essays develop an informational view of semantics that offers the possibility of atomism about meaning; his psychological essays present a modular view of cognitive architecture that offers the possibility of atomism about perception. These ideas, he points out, are joined in epistemology in way that the books last essay begins to explore. Taken together, the essays represent Fodor's lively attempt to knock the underpinnings from the currently popular relativism to show that the arguments for semantic and psychological holism are insubstantial and that important alternatives exist to be explored. Jerry A. Fodor is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and at the City University of New York Graduate Center. A Bradford Book