Endogenizing government’s objectives in tax competition with capital ownership
Endogenizing government’s objectives in tax competition with capital ownership
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DOI：
10.1007/s10797-018-9516-1
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发表时间：
2018-09
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa;Taiki Susa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Keisuke Kawachi;Hikaru Ogawa;Taiki Susa
在这项研究中，我们通过将政府追求的政策目标内生化来扩展横向税收竞争的标准方法。根据文献的战略代表团的游戏，我们认为一个游戏前的阶段，司法管辖区承诺自己作为利维坦或作为仁慈的代理人。我们表明，对称子博弈完美均衡对应于三种情况下的税收竞争的利维坦政府，moderateLeviathans和仁慈的政府，根据资本所有权的形式。进一步的分析表明，不对称的税收竞争导致仁慈政府和（温和的）利维坦政府之间的竞争。这些结果为仁慈或利维坦的目标提供了依据，并解释了为什么有些政府作为一个整体，而另一些政府则致力于不同的目标。
In this study, we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the policy objectives that governments pursue. Following the literature on strategic delegation games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to act as Leviathan or as benevolent agents. We show that the symmetric sub-game perfect equilibria correspond to three cases of tax competition among the Leviathan governments,moderateLeviathans, and benevolent governments, depending on the form of capital ownership. Further analysis reveals that asymmetric tax competition generates competition between the benevolent government and the (moderate) Leviathan government. The results provide grounds for benevolent or Leviathan objectives and explain why some governments act as one, while others aim toward a different objective.