Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World
Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World
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在变暖的世界中重新思考环境联邦主义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Burtraw
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
William M. Shobe;D. Burtraw
气候变化政策分析几乎完全侧重于国家政策，甚至侧重于协调各国的气候政策，隐含的假设是，国家以下一级的气候政策协调将得到授权或保证。我们认为，在一个联邦联盟的气候政策的设计和实施将在重要的方式从单一制政府的政策设计不同。建立在单一治理模式假设基础上的国家气候政策不太可能取得预期结果，因为与国家以下一级的政策选择相互作用。在联邦系统中，国家政策产生的信息和激励措施必须通过各级地方财政和监管政策。有效的政策设计必须认识到联邦政府结构所带来的限制和机会。此外，利用联邦政府结构的政策可以改善气候治理成果。
Climate change policy analysis has focused almost exclusively on national policy and even on harmonizing climate policies across countries, implicitly assuming that harmonization of climate policies at the subnational level would be mandated or guaranteed. We argue that the design and implementation of climate policy in a federal union will diverge in important ways from policy design in a unitary government. National climate policies built on the assumption of a unitary model of governance are unlikely to achieve the expected outcome because of interactions with policy choices made at the subnational level. In a federal system, the information and incentives generated by a national policy must pass through various levels of subnational fiscal and regulatory policy. Effective policy design must recognize both the constraints and the opportunities presented by a federal structure of government. Furthermore, policies that take advantage of the federal structure of government can improve climate governance outcomes.