Michael D. Swaine (2011) America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Michael D. Swaine (2011) America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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Michael D. Swaine (2011) 美国的挑战：二十一世纪与崛起的中国接触：华盛顿特区：卡内基国际和平基金会。
DOI：
10.1163/15685314-12341285
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
J. Granville
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Granville
正如亨利·基辛格所说，外交是“限制权力的艺术”。 20世纪70年代策划美国与中华人民共和国建立外交关系的理查德·尼克松的国家安全顾问喜欢打“中国牌”来对抗苏联，反之亦然。今天，在二十一世纪的第二个十年，美国对华外交必须比简单的限制权力更广泛、更复杂。迈克尔·D·斯温 (Michael D. Swaine) 在其最新著作《美国的挑战》中警告称，他认为两国“国防界正在增长”的“危险的零和思维”，导致一些美国分析人士“断言美国需要不惜一切代价保持对北京的明显优势”（第 16 页）。正如斯温指出的，中国人至少公开地渴望“互惠互利、双赢的合作模式”（第32页）。事实上，鉴于美国日益恶化的经济困境，美国的霸道做法可能会彻底“弄巧成拙”，“甚至会刺激中国在台湾等问题上挑战美国的军事能力”（第16页）。斯温写道，华盛顿政策制定者应避免这种零和思维，而应尝试将中国进一步纳入双边和多边组织（第 16 页）。与乔治·W·布什政府将中国称为“战略竞争对手”相反，华盛顿应该鼓励中国表现得像“负责任的利益相关者”。斯温主张采取合作参与和谨慎“对冲”相结合的政策。
Diplomacy, as Henry Kissinger famously remarked, is ‘the art of restraining power’. The National Security Advisor for Richard Nixon who orchestrated the establishment of US diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in the 1970s was fond of playing the ‘China card’against the Soviet Union, and vice versa. Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, US diplomacy toward China must be broader and more sophisticated than simply restraining power. In his latest book, America’s Challenge, Michael D. Swaine warns against the ‘dangerous zero-sum mindset’he sees ‘growing in the defense communities’ in both countries, leading some US analysts to ‘assert the need for the US to maintain clear predominance over Beijing at whatever cost’(p. 16). As Swaine points out, the Chinese aspire* overtly, at least* to a ‘mutually beneficial, win-win cooperative pattern’[huli shuangying de hezuo geju](p. 32).In fact, given America’s worsening economic plight, a domineering approach by the US could be downright ‘self-defeating’and ‘even spur Chinese efforts to challenge US military capabilities on issues such as Taiwan’(p. 16). Washington policymakers should eschew such zero-sum thinking, Swaine writes, and instead try to incorporate China further into bilateral and multilateral organizations (p. 16). In contrast to the George W. Bush Administration, which called China a ‘strategic competitor’, Washington should encourage China to behave as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. Swaine advocates a policy of combined cooperative engagement and cautious ‘hedging’.