Self-Enforcing Agreements and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Rights
Self-Enforcing Agreements and International Trade in Greenhouse Gas Emission Rights
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温室气体排放权的自我执行协议和国际贸易
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.609042
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Rutherford
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jared C. Carbone;C. Helm;T. Rutherford
任何国际气候变化协议的成功取决于减排目标和各国参与的激励措施。我们证明，尽管假设各国不合作地选择其许可证捐赠，但国际排放交易在这两个问题上取得进展是有效的。发展中国家被许可证销售的预期租金所吸引进入贸易体系。发达国家受益于减排成本的降低。通过对全球经济七个部门和六个地区的校准表示，我们发现最有效的许可证交易协议是次全球的，其收益率下降大约是没有许可证交易的世界中所达到水平的两倍。
The success of any international climate change agreement depends on abatement targets and the incentives for countries to participate. We demonstrate that international emission trading is effective in making headway on both issues despite the assumption that countries choose their permit endowments non-cooperatively. Developing countries are lured into a trading system by the prospective rents from permit sales. Developed countries benefit from the reduced cost of emission abatement. Using a calibrated representation of the global economy in seven sectors and six regions, we find that the most effective permit-trading agreements are sub-global and yield abatement at approximately twice the level achieved in a world without permit trading.