TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
TIT-FOR-TAT IN STICKLEBACKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
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DOI：
10.1038/325433a0
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发表时间：
1987-01-29
期刊：
影响因子：
64.8
通讯作者：
MILINSKI, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
MILINSKI, M
实现相互合作的问题可以在一个叫做囚徒困境的游戏中形式化，在这个游戏中，自私的背叛总是比合作更有回报。如果双方有一定的最小再次相遇的可能性，那么一种叫做以牙还牙的策略就会非常成功。在“以牙还牙”中，玩家在第一步中合作，然后做对手在前一步中做的事情。我研究了鱼在面对潜在捕食者时的行为，因为在这种情况下，成对的鱼可能会发生冲突，我认为这类似于一系列的囚徒困境游戏。利用一套镜子系统，给单条三棘棘鱼（Gasterosteus aculeatus）提供一个模拟的合作伙伴或一个模拟的背叛伙伴，让它们接近一个活生生的捕食者。在这两种情况下，测试鱼的行为都是以牙还牙的，这支持了利己主义者之间可以进化合作的假设。
The problems of achieving mutual cooperation can be formalized in a game called the Prisoner's Dilemma in which selfish defection is always more rewarding than cooperation1. If the two protagonists have a certain minimum probability of meeting again a strategy called TIT FOR TAT is very successful2. In TIT FOR TAT the player cooperates on the first move and thereafter does whatever the opponent did on the previous move. I have studied the behaviour of fish when confronting a potential predator, because conflicts can arise within pairs of fish in these circumstances which I argue resemble a series of games of Prisoner's Dilemma. Using a system of mirrors, single three-spined sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) approaching a live predator were provided with either a simulated cooperating companion or a simulated defecting one. In both cases the test fish behaved according to TIT FOR TAT supporting the hypothesis that cooperation can evolve among egoists.