The Demise of U.S. Economic Growth: Restatement, Rebuttal, and Reflections
The Demise of U.S. Economic Growth: Restatement, Rebuttal, and Reflections
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美国经济增长的消亡：重述、反驳与反思
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Gordon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Gordon
1891年至2007年间，美国实现了人均实际GDP年均增长2.0%。这篇论文预测，在2007年后的25到40年内，增长将会慢得多，特别是对绝大多数人口来说。未来，全经济劳动生产率年均增长1.3%，人均产出年均增长0.9%，收入分配最底层99%的居民人均实际收入年均增长0.4%，收入分配最底层的居民人均实际可支配收入年均增长0.2%。这种增长放缓的主要原因是一系列四个不利因素，所有这些都得到了广泛的认可，而且都没有争议。人口结构的变化将减少人均工作时间，这不仅是因为婴儿潮一代的退休，也是因为年轻人和壮年成年人退出劳动力大军。教育程度是过去一个世纪经济增长的核心驱动力，但随着美国在世界高中和大学毕业率排行榜上的排名下降，教育水平停滞不前。不平等继续加剧，导致收入分配中最底层99%的人的实际收入增长，比所有收入的平均增长低了整整半个百分点。预计各级政府债务与国内生产总值之比的长期增长将不可避免地导致税收收入的更快增长和/或转移支付在未来几十年内的某个时候放缓增长。不需要预测未来创新的步伐会放缓，这种悲观的预测就会成为现实，因为这种放缓在40年前就已经发生了。在1972年前的80年里，劳动生产率以年均0.8%的速度增长，比1972年以来的40年要快。虽然不需要预测未来创新的放缓，但这里提出了怀疑，特别是对技术乐观主义者的怀疑，他们目前认为，我们正处于导致更快技术变革的拐点。这篇论文提供了几个历史例子，表明可以提前50年甚至100年预测技术的未来，并评估了广泛讨论的创新，包括医学研究、小型机器人、3-D打印、大数据、无人驾驶汽车和油气水力压裂。
The United States achieved a 2.0 percent average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1891 and 2007. This paper predicts that growth in the 25 to 40 years after 2007 will be much slower, particularly for the great majority of the population. Future growth will be 1.3 percent per annum for labor productivity in the total economy, 0.9 percent for output per capita, 0.4 percent for real income per capita of the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution, and 0.2 percent for the real disposable income of that group. The primary cause of this growth slowdown is a set of four headwinds, all of them widely recognized and uncontroversial. Demographic shifts will reduce hours worked per capita, due not just to the retirement of the baby boom generation but also as a result of an exit from the labor force both of youth and prime-age adults. Educational attainment, a central driver of growth over the past century, stagnates at a plateau as the U.S. sinks lower in the world league tables of high school and college completion rates. Inequality continues to increase, resulting in real income growth for the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution that is fully half a point per year below the average growth of all incomes. A projected long-term increase in the ratio of debt to GDP at all levels of government will inevitably lead to more rapid growth in tax revenues and/or slower growth in transfer payments at some point within the next several decades. There is no need to forecast any slowdown in the pace of future innovation for this gloomy forecast to come true, because that slowdown already occurred four decades ago. In the eight decades before 1972 labor productivity grew at an average rate 0.8 percent per year faster than in the four decades since 1972. While no forecast of a future slowdown of innovation is needed, skepticism is offered here, particularly about the techno-optimists who currently believe that we are at a point of inflection leading to faster technological change. The paper offers several historical examples showing that the future of technology can be forecast 50 or even 100 years in advance and assesses widely discussed innovations anticipated to occur over the next few decades, including medical research, small robots, 3-D printing, big data, driverless vehicles, and oil-gas fracking.
（纸）医学工作：了解国际医疗费用。
DOI：
10.1257/jep.25.2.3
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic Association
影响因子：
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作者：
Cutler DM;Ly DP
通讯作者：
Ly DP