On the Relationships between Notions of Simulation-Based Security
On the Relationships between Notions of Simulation-Based Security
复制标题
基于模拟的安全概念之间的关系
作者：
Ralf Küsters;Anupam Datta;John C. Mitchell;A. Ramanathan
在文献中已经提出了几种基于模拟的安全性的组合形式，包括通用组合性、黑盒可模拟性及其变体。协议和理想功能之间的这些关系足够相似，以至于它们可以根据其定义的逻辑形式从最强到最弱排序。然而，确定两个关系是否实际上是相同的取决于一些微妙的特征，没有在以前的研究中提出。我们确定了两个主要因素：分布式系统中“主进程”的位置以及在计算复杂度范围内对透明消息转发的一些限制。使用一个通用的计算框架，称为顺序概率过程演算（SPPC），我们澄清基于模拟的安全条件之间的关系。许多证明都是基于涉及进程和分布式系统的一小部分等效原则进行的。这些等价性展示了证明安全概念之间关系所需的基本性质，并允许我们将结果转移到满足这些等价性的计算模型。
Several compositional forms of simulation-based security have been proposed in the literature, including Universal Composability, Black-Box Simulatability, and variants thereof. These relations between a protocol and an ideal functionality are similar enough that they can be ordered from strongest to weakest according to the logical form of their definitions. However, determining whether two relations are in fact identical depends on some subtle features that have not been brought out in previous studies. We identify two main factors: the position of a “master process” in the distributed system and some limitations on transparent message forwarding within computational complexity bounds. Using a general computational framework, called Sequential Probabilistic Process Calculus (SPPC), we clarify the relationships between the simulation-based security conditions. Many of the proofs are carried out based on a small set of equivalence principles involving processes and distributed systems. These equivalences exhibit the essential properties needed to prove relationships between security notions and allow us to carry over our results to those computational models which satisfy these equivalences.