The political philosophy of poststructuralist anarchism

The political philosophy of poststructuralist anarchism
复制标题

后结构主义无政府主义的政治哲学

DOI:
--
复制
发表时间:
1994
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Todd May
Todd May
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Todd May

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

从本质上讲,哈贝马斯试图在革命之前提供“现状”和“应该”的统一,不仅作为革命的前提,而且作为所有借用革命的尝试的前提,以避免霍克海默和阿多诺描述的恶魔总体化的陷阱。那么,哈贝马斯的策略不仅旨在统一,而且还以此为前提。此外,由于这个预设,哈贝马斯通过提供他自己的分析,在历史上受其文化的语言参数的约束,避免了可能出现的对交往行为的先验解释的任何弱点。然而,正是这种哲学的可能性的预设给哈贝马斯带来了麻烦。从表面上看,他的分析似乎放弃了战略层面,而转向了形式层面。他正在分析为抵抗提供资源的背景现实,类似于阿尔都塞认为历史力量为向共产主义过渡提供基础的方式。然而,哈贝马斯的主张只是说,在我们的历史情境中,理性是这样构成的,它以理想的言语情境为前提。32哈贝马斯没有在任何地方主张理想的言语情境曾经实现过,而且他似乎也觉得没有必要这样做,认为理想的言语情境即使在未实现或无法实现的情况下也可以充当激励因素。事实上,他似乎无法争论这个目标是否能够实现。声称它是在一个特定的情况下发生的,这会让人们面临一个挑战,即人们如何知道情况是这样的,而回答这一挑战涉及到一个假设,即人们可以区分理想的言论和扭曲的言论,这将导致无限的倒退。但是,如果理想的言语情境从未实现而只是预设的,那么哈贝马斯对交往行为的分析怎能允许任何逃避霍克海默和阿多诺声称已成为当代社会命运的资本主义总体化的空洞可能性呢?
In essence, Habermas tries to provide a unity of the is and the ought before the revolution, as a presupposition not only of the revolution but of all attempts to co-opt that revolution, in order to avoid the trap of demonic totalization described by Horkheimer and Adorno. Habermas’s strategy, then, not only aims at unity but also presupposes it. Further, because of that presupposition, Habermas avoids any weaknesses that might attend a transcendental account of communicative action by offering his own analysis as historically bound by the linguistic parameters of his culture. It is, however, the very presuppositions of the possibility of such a philosophy that create trouble for Habermas. On the surface, his analysis appears to abandon the strategic level in favor of the formal level; he is analyzing a contextual reality that provides the resources for resistance, analogous to the way Althusser argues that historical forces provide the basis for the transition to communism. However, Habermas’s claim is only that in our historical situation rationality is so constituted that it presupposes the ideal speech situation.32 Nowhere does Habermas argue that the ideal speech situation is ever achieved, and seemingly he feels no need to, holding that the ideal speech situation serves as a motivator even when unachieved or unachievable. In fact, he seems precluded from arguing that it could ever be achieved. To claim that it had been in a specific instance would lay one open to the challenge of how one knew that to be the case, and answering that challenge involves the presumption that one can tell the difference between ideal and distorted speech, which would lead to an infinite regress. But then, if the ideal speech situation is never achieved but only presupposed, how can Habermas’s analysis of communicative action allow for anything more than an empty possibility of escaping the capitalist totalization that Horkheimer and Adorno claim has become the lot of contemporary society?