Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences

Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences
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词典编排偏好下可分割商品的分配

DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
V. Vazirani
V. Vazirani
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
L. Schulman;V. Vazirani

文献摘要

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我们提出了一种简单而自然的非定价机制，用于在具有词典偏好的战略代理之间分配可分商品。该机制具有良好的防策略性(激励相容)。此外(甚至当扩展到Leontief捆绑包的情况下)，它享有帕累托效率、无嫉妒和时间效率。
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.