Price Leadership: A Theoretical Analysis
Price Leadership: A Theoretical Analysis
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价格领先：理论分析
DOI：
10.2307/2553520
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发表时间：
1982
期刊：
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Yoshiyasu Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yoshiyasu Ono
本文建立了一个价格领导模型，以一致的方式处理各种类型的价格领导，并从理论的角度重新划分为三种类型的价格领导。许多经济学家，如Forchheimer（1908）、Nichol（1930）、Stigler（1947 b）、Markham（1951）、Lanzillotti（1957）和Bain（1960），都描述了不同类型的价格领导。谢勒（Scherer，1970）将价格领导分为三种类型：主导型、合谋型和气压式价格领导。所谓“支配型”，是指市场份额最大的支配企业牢固地确立了价格领导地位，而其他小企业则成为追随者的产业。串通型（垄断型的施蒂格勒的晴雨表价格领导）是指一些主要企业制定价格，其他小企业遵循，因此价格水平是垄断性的，而不是竞争性的。谢勒（1970，第170页）指出，在这种情况下，价格领导者调整其价格政策，以抑制产业内冲突。2最后，在气压型（斯蒂格勒气压式价格领导的竞争型）中，价格围绕竞争水平确定。3贝恩（1960，第201页）将这种类型描述为领导加价格让步模式。然而，他们的分类是基于市场结构或行为，既没有解释为什么市场结构是这样决定的，也没有澄清为什么每个企业选择当前的行为模式，因为他们没有建立一个可以一致地处理各种类型的价格领导力的通用价格领导模型。因此，传统的分类标准从理论上讲是相当模糊的。例如，虽然支配型被区分为拥有最大市场份额的类型，但支配型企业出现的临界份额的值是模糊的。[4]区分合谋和气压式价格领导的标准之一是均衡价格是垄断还是竞争，但我们如何确定临界价格的值呢？为了消除歧义，从市场需求、边际成本差异和产品质量差异等基本条件出发，从理论上推导出几种价格领导类型，本文分析了这些条件与各企业最优行为模式之间的关系。在此分析的基础上，对每个企业的行为模式的后果进行调查，使我们能够为各种类型的价格领导提供一些理论基础。本文件介绍了，在第一节中，价格领导模型的情况下，同质和异质的商品，并制定了几个定理，澄清为什么以及何时每个公司喜欢的价格领导地位或追随地位。利用这些定理，第二节从理论上将价格领导地位重新划分为三种类型。第三节对本文进行了总结和归纳。
This paper establishes a price leadership model which deals with various types of price leadership in a consistent manner, and reclassifies price leadership into three types from a theoretical point of view. Many economists, such as Forchheimer (1908), Nichol (1930), Stigler (1947b), Markham (1951), Lanzillotti (1957) and Bain (1960), have described various types of price leadership. These have been classified by Scherer (1970) into three types: dominant, collusive, and barometric price leadership. The dominant type' is considered to describe industries in which a dominant firm, which has the largest market share, solidly establishes the price leadership position with the other minor firms being followers. The collusive type (the monopolistic type of Stigler's barometric price leadership) is where some principal firms set prices which are followed by other minor firms, and so the price level is rather monopolistic than competitive. Scherer (1970, p. 170) has stated that price-leaders temper their price policies in order to suppress intra-industry conflicts in this case.2 Finally, in the barometric type (the competitive type of Stigler's barometric price leadership), the price is set around the competitive level.3 Bain (1960, p. 201) has characterized this type as the leadership-plus-price-concession pattern. However, their classification is based upon either market structure or conduct, and they have neither explained why the market structure is thus decided nor clarified why each firm chooses the present behaviour pattern, since they have not established a general price leadership model which can consistently deal with various types of price leadership. Therefore, the criteria for the traditional classification are rather ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. For example, though the dominant type is distinguished as that with the largest market share, the value of the critical share for a dominant firm to emerge is vaguely decided.4 One of the criteria that discriminates between collusive and barometric price leadership is whether the equilibrium price is monopolistic or competitive, but how can we determine the value of the critical price? In order to eliminate the ambiguity and deduce several types of price leadership theoretically from such fundamental conditions as the market demand, differences in marginal cost and in quality of products, we analyse here the relation between those conditions and each firm's optimal behaviour pattern. On the basis of this analysis, an investigation of the consequences of each firm's behaviour pattern leads us to adduce some theoretical basis for the various types of price leadership. The present paper describes, in Section I, a price leadership model in the case of homogeneous and heterogeneous goods, and develops several theorems that clarify why and when each firm prefers either the price leadership position or the followership position. Using these theorems, Section II reclassifies the price leadership theoretically into three types. Section III summarizes and concludes this paper.