Game theory for cyber security
Game theory for cyber security
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网络安全博弈论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Dasgupta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Shiva;Sankardas Roy;D. Dasgupta
虽然信息技术和基础设施取得了重大进展，提供了新的机会，但网络空间仍远未完全安全。在许多情况下，所采用的安全解决方案是临时的，缺乏定量决策框架。虽然它们在解决它们所设计的特定问题时是有效的，但它们通常不能在动态变化的场景中很好地响应。为此，我们在本文中提出了一个整体的安全方法。我们发现，博弈论提供了巨大的潜力，把这样的方法在一个坚实的分析设置。我们认为攻击和防御机制之间的相互作用是攻击者和防御者（系统管理员）之间的博弈。特别是，我们提出了一个游戏理论启发的防御体系结构中，游戏模型作为大脑。本文重点研究了我们最近提出的一个博弈模型，即不完全信息随机博弈。虽然这种博弈模型似乎是有前途的，但它也面临着新的挑战，值得未来的关注。我们讨论我们目前的想法，扩展这个模型来应对这些挑战。
While there are significant advances in information technology and infrastructure which offer new opportunities, cyberspace is still far from completely secured. In many cases, the employed security solutions are ad hoc and lack a quantitative decision framework. While they are effective in solving the particular problems they are designed for, they generally fail to respond well in a dynamically changing scenario. To this end, we propose a holistic security approach in this paper. We find that game theory provides huge potential to place such an approach on a solid analytical setting. We consider the interaction between the attacks and the defense mechanisms as a game played between the attacker and the defender (system administrator). In particular, we propose a game theory inspired defense architecture in which a game model acts as the brain. We focus on one of our recently proposed game models, namely imperfect information stochastic game. Although this game model seems to be promising, it also faces new challenges which warrant future attention. We discuss our current ideas on extending this model to address such challenges.