Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War
Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War
复制标题
为什么治理不善会导致内战重演
DOI：
10.1177/0022002714528006
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Barbara F. Walter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Barbara F. Walter
大多数当代内战现在都是早期内战的重演。与传统的委屈和机会理论不同，本文提出了一种内战重演的理论，强调了政治和法律制度在内战后国家约束精英方面发挥的关键作用。这样的约束是对行政权力的制约，有助于在职精英可信地致力于政治改革，并创造一种局面，使反对派不需要维持民兵作为一种补充机制来控制政治精英。所有这些都减少了内战重演的可能性。通过对冲突后年份的统计分析，本文表明，强大的政治制度不仅与内战重演显著负相关，而且是国家是否陷入冲突陷阱的主要决定因素。
Most contemporary civil wars are now recurrences of earlier civil wars. In contrast to classic theories of grievance and opportunity, this article advances a theory of civil war recurrence that highlights the critical role political and legal institutions play in constraining elites in post–civil war states. Such constraints serve as a check on executive power, help incumbent elites credibly commit to political reform, and create a situation where rebels need not maintain militias as a supplementary mechanism to hold political elites in line. All of this reduces the odds of repeat civil war. Using a statistical analysis of post-conflict years, this article demonstrates that strong political institutions are not only significantly and negatively related to repeat civil war but are the primary determinants of whether countries get caught in the conflict trap.