A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks
A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.033
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发表时间：
2011-01-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Konno, Tomohiko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Konno, Tomohiko
我们研究复杂网络上囚徒困境博弈中有利于合作的一个条件。存在两种参与者：合作者和背叛者。合作者以成本\(c\)为其邻居提供收益\(b\)，而背叛者只获得收益。该博弈是一个弱选择的生死过程。尽管人们普遍认为\(b/c > <k>\)是有利于合作的一个条件（大槻等人，2006年），但我们发现\(b/c > <k(nn)>\)才是这个条件。我们还表明，在三种具有代表性的网络，即规则网络、随机网络和无标度网络中，规则网络最有利于合作，而无标度网络最不利于合作。在一个理想的无标度网络中，合作永远无法实现。无标度网络和网络异质性是否有利于合作取决于博弈的细节，尽管偶尔有人认为无论博弈结构如何，它们都有利于合作。（C）2010爱思唯尔有限公司。保留所有权利。
We study a condition of favoring cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive a benefit. The game is a death-birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c > < k > is a condition of favoring cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006), we find that b/c > < k(nn)> is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.