John Lin,Yan Chen,Tim Finholt
John Lin,Yan Chen,Tim Finholt
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林约翰、陈彦、蒂姆·芬霍尔特
DOI：
10.1007/s10683-010-9252-6
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kan Takeuchi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Toyotaka Sakai;Toyotaka Sakai;坂井豊貴;坂井豊貴;坂井豊貴;坂井豊貴;坂井豊貴;古瀬 啓之;古瀬啓之;大津敬介;Kan Takeuchi;Kan Takeuchi;竹内幹;Kan Takeuchi
在科学合作中，技术扩大了获取稀缺科学和工程资源的途径。虽然经常赞扬更广泛的机会，但很少注意有效和公平分配资源的问题。本文介绍了实验室实验，旨在比较不同的分配机制，以获得联合研究设施。具体来说，我们研究了Vickrey-Clarke-Groves （VCG）拍卖、同时升序拍卖（Resource Allocation Design， RAD）和基于提交排名的机制（backpack）。实验结果表明，RAD和VCG的效率都高于backpack，而backpack比RAD和VCG实现了更均匀的资源分配。这一发现强调了对合作实验室内部分配机制进行系统探索的必要性。
In scientific collaborations, technologies have broadened access to scarce scientific and engineering resources. While broader access is often applauded, little attention has been focused on the problem of efficient and equitable resource allocation. This paper presents laboratory experiments designed to compare different allocation mechanisms for access to joint research facilities. Specifically, we study the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, a simultaneous ascending auction (the Resource Allocation Design, RAD), and a mechanism based on submitted rankings (Knapsack). Experimental results show that RAD and VCG are both more efficient than Knapsack, while Knapsack achieves a more equal distribution of resources than RAD or VCG. The findings highlight the need for systematic exploration of allocation mechanisms within collaboratories.