THE AGENT'S ROLE IN THE CAUSATION OF ACTION: IS MICHAEL SMITH'S CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION IN TROUBLE?
THE AGENT'S ROLE IN THE CAUSATION OF ACTION: IS MICHAEL SMITH'S CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION IN TROUBLE?
复制标题
行为人在行动因果关系中的角色：迈克尔·史密斯的行动因果理论有问题吗？
DOI：
10.1590/0100-512x2019n14208lmd
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Lucas Mateus Dalsotto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lucas Mateus Dalsotto
摘要本文旨在探讨迈克尔·史密斯的行为因果理论是否能够解决大卫·维勒曼提出的卓越代理挑战。Smith（2012）声称，他的理论可以应对这一挑战，因为工具理性能力的行使发挥了Velleman （1992a）认为行为人在行为因果关系中发挥的中介作用。然而，我认为史密斯误解了眼前的挑战，因此未能找到行为人在行动解释中的适当角色。此外，我认为Velleman的反对意见让Smith的因果理论陷入了困境，因为它无法将有意行为的因果解释与我们通常的能动性概念相协调。如果史密斯想要解释什么是“纯粹的”故意行为，那么我认为他需要在他的理论中加入对理性指导的更有力的解释。
ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to find out if Michael Smith's version of the causal theory of action is able to solve David Velleman's agency par excellence challenge. Smith (2012) has claimed that his theory can deal with the challenge insofar as the exercise of the capacity to be instrumentally rational plays the intermediating role which Velleman (1992a) thinks of the agent as playing in the causation of action. However, I argue Smith misunderstands the challenge at hand, thereby failing to find the agent's proper role in action explanation. Moreover, I claim Velleman's objection puts Smith's account of the causal theory in trouble by showing it cannot reconcile the causal explanation of intentional action with our ordinary conception of agency. If Smith intends to explain what a 'full-blooded' intentional action is, I then believe he needs to incorporate into his theory a more robust account of rational guidance.