Fixed salary or incentive contract? The effect of stickiness of compensation contracts
Fixed salary or incentive contract? The effect of stickiness of compensation contracts
复制标题
固定工资还是激励合同？
DOI：
10.1080/16081625.2019.1673191
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Wakabayashi Toshiaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
山口真一;彌永浩太郎;坂口洋英;Taichi Kimura and Yutaro Murakami;王志;Wakabayashi Toshiaki
本研究以行为契约理论为基础，透过数学模式，厘清固定薪酬契约优于激励契约的情形。理论上，基于激励的合同对委托人的期望效用更高，但实际上，存在通过固定工资合同雇佣员工的公司。本研究发现，在多任务情况下，存在委托人应该提供固定工资合同的情况，由于行为因素，薪酬合同将变得无效率;然而，通过采用适当的业绩衡量标准，可以减少效率低下的情况。
This study adopts behavioural contract theory through a mathematical model and clarifies the situation in which a fixed–salary contract is preferable to an incentives–based one for the principal. Theoretically, the expected utility for the principal is higher under an incentives–based contract but, in reality, there are companies that employ people via fixed–salary contracts.This study fined that, in the multitasking case, a case exists in which the principal should offer a fixed–salary contract, and due to behavioural elements, compensation contracts will become inefficient; however, inefficiency may be reduced by using appropriate performance measures.