Inferring the goals of a nonhuman agent
Inferring the goals of a nonhuman agent
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DOI：
10.1016/s0885-2014(01)00043-0
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发表时间：
2001-01-01
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
O'Hearn, K
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Johnson, SC;Booth, A;O'Hearn, K
约翰逊、斯劳特和凯里[Dev. Sci. 1（1998）233.]使用婴儿跟随新物体的“凝视”的能力，声称婴儿对精神代理的识别与人的识别不是同构的，而是基于一组非任意的物体识别线索，包括面部的存在和与其他代理偶然互动的能力。目前的研究扩展了这些发现的数据基础上的婴儿模仿和生产的交际手势。第一项研究复制了Meltzoff的[Dev. 31（1995）838.]用一个新的非人类代理人重新制定目标范例。15个月奥尔兹被发现能够重新制定一个新物体的完成和未完成/未看到的目标，这个新物体有一张脸，并与实验者和婴儿进行偶然的互动。与此同时，婴儿对物体做出了许多交际手势。第二项研究排除了这样一种可能性，即研究1中明显针对对象的交际手势实际上是对实验者自己行为的模仿。新颖的、非人类的物体能够从婴儿身上引发诸如注视、目标再现和交流手势等不同的行为，这一观点支持了以下主张：所有这些行为都是由一个关于心灵存在的中心概念所介导的，至少在所研究的年龄范围内是如此，而且这个概念与概念人并不同构。(C)2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Johnson, Slaughter, and Carey [Dev. Sci. 1 (1998) 233.] used infants' ability to follow the 'gaze' of novel objects to claim that infants' recognition of mentalistic agents is not isomorphic with person recognition but rather based on a set of nonarbitrary object recognition cues including the presence of a face and the ability to interact contingently with other agents. The current studies extend these findings with data based on infant imitation and the production of communicative gestures. The first study replicated Meltzoff's [Dev. Psychol. 31 (1995) 838.] reenactment of goals paradigm with a novel, nonhuman agent. Fifteen-month-olds were found to reenact both the completed and uncompleted/unseen goals of a novel object that had a face and interacted contingently with the experimenter and infant. Concurrently, infants directed many communicative gestures at the object. A second study excluded the possibility that the communicative gestures apparently directed at the object in Study 1 were in fact imitations of the experimenter's own behavior. The suggestion that novel, nonhuman objects are capable of eliciting such divergent behaviors as gaze-following, goal reenactment, and communicative gestures from infants, supports the claim that all of these behaviors are mediated by a central conceptual notion of mentalistic being, at least by the ages studied, and that that concept is not isomorphic with the concept person. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.