'Arranger Liability' under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent
'Arranger Liability' under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent
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《综合环境响应、补偿和责任法案》(CERCLA) 下的“安排者责任”：司法撤回立法意图
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发表时间：
1998
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通讯作者：
D. W. Lannetti
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作者：
D. W. Lannetti
虽然很容易同情法院的直觉愿望，即追究其恶劣和侵权行为对社会其他人造成环境危害的当事人的责任，但我们也必须认识到国会颁布的法规的限制。 CERCLA 实行严格责任；根据定义，过错或过错责任的考虑在其条款下是无关紧要的。(1) 在颁布《1980 年综合环境响应、补偿和责任法案》(2) (CERCLA) 时，国会打算追究“安排”处置危险材料的责任方等的责任。该法规未能明确定义“安排”，加上其立法历史较少，导致联邦上诉法院对 CERCLA 安排者责任有多种解释，从严格责任标准到需要特定意图的标准。由于缺乏统一的司法方法，受该法规影响的个人和公司处于不稳定的境地，无法确定其作为 CERCLA 规定的“安排者”的潜在责任。然而，这种混淆是不必要的，因为现有的法定语言和现有的立法历史足以辨别国会意图以及法院在解释 CERCLA 时所要求的“安排”的含义。在 CERCLA 颁布后的第一个十年中，法院主要依据 CERCLA 的法定措辞及其现有的立法历史，始终对那些“安排”处置或处理危险物质的人适用严格的责任标准。然而，1993 年，理查德·波斯纳法官在为美国第七巡回上诉法院撰写文章时，选择采用要求特定意图的方法，(3) 忽略了十多年来的 CERCLA 判例法。不幸的是，波斯纳法官判决的影响远远超出了该个案的事实；从本质上讲，该意见向其他法院表明，CERCLA 安排人的责任可能受到不同的解释，为司法行动主义奠定了基础。在波斯纳作出裁决后，位于先前未对 CERCLA 安排人责任问题做出裁决的司法管辖区的联邦法院在查阅上诉判例法时发现了两种不同的方法。这最终导致了第三种中间立场方法的诞生，涉及对每个个案的“总体情况”评估。国会所设想的严格责任计划实际上已被现代司法机构放弃，取而代之的是具体考虑当事人的意图、知识和所有权利益的具体案例分析的趋势。本说明追溯了自该法规颁布以来 CERCLA 责任计划的演变。首先简要介绍了 CERCLA 的历史，并简要介绍了传统的法律解释框架。该说明随后描述了法院在追究 CERCLA“安排者”责任时所采取的各种方法：严格责任；具体意图；以及“总体情况”或具体情况分析。本说明认为，在法规和立法历史中都存在足够的证据，表明国会打算追究 CERCLA“安排者”的严格责任。本说明还假设，波斯纳法官的判决是对法院先前适用的严格责任的几乎普遍做法的不合理的司法偏离。最后，本说明建议美国最高法院通过应用法定措辞中引用的和联邦立法机构意图的严格责任方案来解决联邦上诉法院在解释 CERCLA 安排人责任时所采用的不同方法。 CERCLA 的历史 1980 年 CERCLA 颁布时，环境保护局 (EPA) 估计美国每年产生 5700 万吨危险废物，即每个公民约 600 磅。 ……
Although it is easy to sympathize with the courts' intuitive desire to hold liable parties whose egregious and tortious actions have posed environmental hazards for the rest of society, we must also recognize the constraints of the statute that Congress has enacted. CERCLA imposes strict liability; considerations of fault or blameworthiness are, by definition, irrelevant under its terms.(1) In enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980(2) (CERCLA), Congress intended to hold liable, among others, responsible parties that "arranged for" the disposal of hazardous materials. The statute's failure to explicitly define "arranged for," combined with its scant legislative history, has led to multiple interpretations of CERCLA arranger liability by the federal courts of appeals, ranging from a standard of strict liability to a standard requiring specific intent. The lack of a unified judicial approach places individuals and corporations affected by the statute in the precarious position of being uncertain of their potential liability as "arrangers" under CERCLA. The confusion is unnecessary, however, because the existing statutory language and the available legislative history are sufficient to discern the meaning of "arranged for" intended by Congress and required of the courts when interpreting CERCLA. During the first decade following CERCLA's enactment, courts consistently applied a strict liability standard to those who "arranged for" the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances, relying primarily on the statutory wording of CERCLA and its available legislative history. In 1993, however, when writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner opted instead to adopt an approach requiring specific intent,(3) ignoring over a decade of existing CERCLA case law. Unfortunately, the effect of Judge Posner's decision extended well beyond the facts of that individual case; in essence, the opinion served as an indication to other courts that CERCLA arranger liability was subject to varying interpretations, setting the stage for judicial activism. Following Posner's decision, federal courts located in jurisdictions that previously had not ruled on the issue of CERCLA arranger liability discovered two disparate approaches when consulting appellate case law. This eventually led to the genesis of a third, middle-ground approach involving a "totality of the circumstances" assessment of each individual case. The strict liability scheme intended by Congress has been virtually abandoned by the modern judiciary, replaced with a trend toward a case-by-case analysis that specifically considers the intent, knowledge, and ownership interests of the parties. This Note traces the evolution of CERCLA's liability scheme since the statute's inception. It begins with a brief history of CERCLA and a short description of the traditional framework for statutory interpretation. The Note then describes the various approaches the courts have adopted in holding CERCLA "arrangers" liable: strict liability; specific intent; and a "totality of the circumstances," or case-by-case analysis. This Note argues that sufficient evidence exists, both in the statute and in the legislative history, to show that Congress intended to hold CERCLA "arrangers" strictly liable. This Note also postulates that Judge Posner's decision was an unjustified judicial deviation from the virtually universal approach of strict liability previously applied by the courts. Finally, this Note recommends that the United States Supreme Court resolve the different approaches the federal appellate courts have adopted in interpreting CERCLA arranger liability by applying the strict liability scheme referenced in the statutory wording and intended by the federal legislature. HISTORY OF CERCLA At the time of CERCLA's enactment in 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that the United States produced fifty-seven million metric tons of hazardous waste per year, or about six hundred pounds per citizen. …