Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure
Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure
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DOI：
10.1007/s10640-009-9340-2
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发表时间：
2010-01
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Sususmu Cato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sususmu Cato
本文的目的是研究在生产过程产生排放的自由进入市场中退还排放税的最佳方案。我们考虑通过三部分税收政策进行监管：政府制定排放税、退款计划和进入许可证税。与无入境情况下的两部分退税政策的情况相比，我们表明，即使不可能从外部获得补贴，也总是能达到最佳结果。此外，政府的预算约束在最优方案下具有约束力。我们的结果表明，退税制度在内生进入的市场中有效运作。
The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free-entry market where the production process generates emissions. We consider the regulation by a three-part tax policy: the government sets an emission tax, a refunding scheme, and an entry-license tax. In contrast to the case of the two-part tax-refund policy under no entry, we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside, the first-best outcome is always attained. Further, the government’s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes. Our result implies that the tax-refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry.